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THE RIGHTS OF A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF A BILL OF
LADING TO A LIMITATION PERIOD ON ACTIONS
I. Introduction
Since May of 1971 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas has considered several cases involving the nature and extent of
the rights that a stevedore obtains as a third party beneficiary to a bill of lading.'
In each case, the bill of lading contract for shipment between the shipper and
carrier incorporated the provisions of the Carrier of Goods by Sea Act2 (here-
inafter referred to as COGSA). The contract specifically incorporated section
1303(6) of that Act which establishes a one year statute of limitations on all
actions regarding damage to the goods which begins to run on the date of
delivery. The benefit of this one year limitation period was extended by the
parties to various third parties including stevedores.
The cases which were considered dealt with attempts by the third party
beneficiary stevedore to bar either (1) direct actions by the cargo interests (i.e.,
shippers, insurers subrogated to shippers' claims, consignees of shipment) for
damage to the goods,3 or (2) indirect, third party actions for indemnity brought
by the carrier who was currently being sued by the cargo interests.4 As to the
direct actions, the cases are in conflict despite identical facts. In one case it was
held that the stevedore's third party beneficiary status was not a bar to the
action,5 while another case reaches the contrary conclusion.6 However, with
regard to the indirect third party action for indemnity the cases axe in accord,
each determining that the action could not be barred by the stevedore. This
note examines the applicability of the one year limitation period in relation to
both direct actions and to indirect indemnity actions brought against stevedores.
Particular emphasis will be placed upon the conceptual frameworks which were
employed in the cases in order to determine the nature, extent and modifications
of the third party beneficiary's right.
II. Direct Actions
A. The Facts and Issues
Two of the cases, Sumitomo Shoji American, Inc., v. S. S. Aurora,' and
1 Toyomenka, Inc. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Tex.
1972); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. S. S. Aurora II, 342 F. Supp. 298 (S.D. Tex. 1972);
Mitsui & Co. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Dorsid
Trading Co. v. S. S. Fletero, 342 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Marubeni-lida, Inc. v.
Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 327 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
2 46 U.S.C.A. § 1300.
3 Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. S. S. Aurora II, 342 F. Supp. 298 (S.D. Tex. 1972);
Dorsid Trading Co. v. S. S. Fletero, 342 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
4 Toyomenka, Inc. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushikl Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Tex.
1972); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. S. S. Aurora, 342 F. Supp. 298 (S.D. Tex. 1972);
Mitsui & Co. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Maru-
beni-Iida, Inc. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 327 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
5 Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. S. S. Aurora II, 342 F. Supp. 298, 299 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
6 Dorsid Trading Co. v. S. S. Fletero, 342 F. Supp. 1, 9 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
7 342 F. Supp. 298 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
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Dorsid Trading Co. u. S. S. Fleter, 8 deal with a direct action by a cargo interest
against a stevedore initiated after the one year period. In Shoji the carrier issued
to the shipper a bill of lading containing the following pertinent clauses:
Clause 19:
In any event the carrier and the shipper shall be discharged from all
liability in respect of loss, damage, delay, or any other claim concerning the
goods of their carriage, including, but not limited to, any claims by the
preceding or connecting carriers for contribution or indemnification for
claims asserted against or paid by such other carriers, unless suit is brought
within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods
should have been delivered. Suit shall not be deemed brought until juris-
diction has been obtained over the carrier or ship by service of process or by
an agreement to appear. Nothing shall be deemed a waiver of any of the
provisions of this clause or clause 18 except an express written waiver
specifically referring thereto and signed by the carrier or its authorized
agent.
Clause 24:
In addition to those hereinabove listed as included in the term "car-
rier," the owners, managers, charterers, master, officers and crew members
of the ship and the carrier's agents, servants, officers, stevedores, longshore-
men, representatives, contractors, terminal operators or others dealing with
cargo destined for or discharged from the vessel or used, engaged or em-
ployed by the vessel and the carrier, and any substituted vessel or carrier,
whether any of them be acting as carrier or bailee or as an independent
contractor shall have the benefit of all privileges and of all exemptions, im-
munities from, and limitations of liability granted to, carrier in this bill of
lading, or by laws applicable to the carrier, including, but not limited to,
those limitations set forth in clauses 17 and 19 of this bill of lading, and
the carrier shall be deemed to contract for the benefit of all such parties in
this regard. Protections extended to third persons in the foregoing are
granted to the extent permitted by law or contract, but shall in no event give
rise to any liability of the carrier to such third person.9
The goods arrived and were discharged by the stevedore pursuant to an oral
contract with the shipper. The goods were damaged somewhere along the line
and the shipper was compensated by its insurer who was thereby subrogated to
any claim of the shipper. The insurer then requested the carrier to grant an
extension of the period of limitations, and the carrier complied. Then, within
the extended period but beyond the one year period of limitations, the insurer
brought an action against both the carrier and stevedore. The stevedore con-
tended that the action by the cargo interest (the carrier's insurer) was barred by
reason of the one year limitation period to which it was a third party beneficiary.
8 342 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
9 Toyomenka, Inc. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 292, 293, 294 n.1 & 2
(S.D. Tex. 1972), citing the same clauses which are pertinent to Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc.
v. S. S. Aurora II, 342 F. Supp. 298 '(S.D. Tex. 1972).
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The court in Shoji, per Judge Singleton, disagreed and held that the action was
not barred?
The Dorsid fact pattern is fundamentally the same. The carrier issued to
the shipper a bill of lading with the following provisions:
(a) Because of the relationship between them and as the carrier requires
persons and companies to perform or assist it in performance of work or
services undertaken by it in this contract, it is expressly agreed between the
parties hereto that the .. . stevedores [and certain others] . .. used, engaged
or employed by the carrier in the performance of such work or services, shall
each be the beneficiaries of and shall be entitled to the same, but no further
exemptions and immunities from and limitations of liability which the
carrier has under this bill of lading.
(b) Without limitation or restriction of the exemptions and immunities
from and limitations of liability provided for in subdivision (a), the persons
and companies mentioned therein shall be entitled to the same ... benefits
which the carrier has under clauses 25 and 29 of this bill of lading."
Clause 29 provides as follows:
[I]n any event, the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability
for any loss or damage to the goods . . . or any claim whatsoever kind,
nature or description, with respect to or in connection with the goods unless
suit . .. is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date
when the goods should have been delivered. 2
Upon arrival the goods were discharged by the stevedore pursuant to an
oral contract with the carrier. The consignee of the shipment contended that
the goods had been damaged by mishandling. The consignee requested exten-
sions on the one year period from both the carrier and the stevedore, which
extensions were granted. However, the carrier continued to grant still further
extensions. Finally, within the period of extension granted by the carrier but
well after the period granted by the stevedore, the cargo interest brought an
action against both the carrier and the stevedore. The stevedore contended that
the action was barred and the court, per Judge Bue, agreed. 3
There are several preliminary points to be made at this time in order to
narrow the issue involved. First, it is permissible for the contracting parties to
extend such a benefit to a third party.'4 Second, the time limitation may effec-
tively be waived or modified by the parties without contravening the purpose of
the statute.' Third, the oral contracts between the carrier and the stevedore
would not, in and of themselves, be within the scope of COGSA and conse-
10 342 F. Supp. at 298-99. Eventually the carrier in this case brought a third party
action for indemnity against the stevedore; this will be discussed in Part III of this note.
11 342 F. Supp. at 5-6. (Emphasis omitted.)
12 Id. at 6. (Emphasis omitted.)
13 Id. at 5-6.
14 Toyomenka, Inc. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 292, 294 (S.D. Tex.
1972) citing Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp., 359 U.S. 297 (1959); Carle & Mon-
tanari Inc. v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
aff'd per curiam 386 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968).
15 Toyomenka, Inc. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 292, 293 (S.D.
Tex. 1972) citing United Fruit Co. v. J. A. Folger Co., 270 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1959).
[April, 1973]
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quently would not be governed by a one year statute of limitations.' Fourth,
the difference in language used in the bills of lading in Shoji and Dorsid does not
account for the differing results. Judge Bue, in Mitsui & Co. v. Toko Kaiun
Kabushiki Kaisha7 states with regard to language identical to that in Shoji:
It is unnecessary to discuss Texports' [the stevedore] status as a third party
beneficiary to the contract of carriage as evidenced by the bill of lading
inasmuch as . .. this Court this day entered its Memorandum and Order
in Dorsid... which Memorandum explores the case law and basis for and
the nature of such third party beneficiary relationships.' 8
So at least the court in Dorsid, presumably, does not recognize any substantive
difference in the language in the two bills of lading. Fifth, in Shoji the opinion
in its companion case Toyomenka, Inc. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha was
adopted as "memorandum and order" for the Shoji decision." Therefore, it is
to Toyomenka that we look for the analysis appliable in Shoji. Having clarified
these points, our consideration can now turn to the central issue which both
Dorsid and Shoji share in common:
[W]hen such a benefit.., has been bestowed on a third party ... by the
contracting parties... can such benefit thereafter be waived, withdrawn or
rescinded unilaterally by the carrier without the agreement of the third
party beneficiary?20
B. Nature of the Benefits: Creditor Beneficiary Versus Incidental Beneficiary
In both Dorsid and Toyomenka-Shoji the analysis is begun by dassifying
the stevedore into one of the three mutually exclusive standard categories of third
party beneficiaries-donee, creditor and incidental.2' Judge Singleton, expressly,
and Judge Bue, implicitly, both conclude that given the overall commercial and
business context of the transaction the carrier had no donative intent and the
stevedore was not a donee beneficiary.22 However, in their final determinations,
the courts came to contrary results. Dorsid decided that the stevedore was a
creditor beneficiary,2 ' while Toyomenka-Shoji determined that the stevedore
was merely an incidental beneficiary having no enforceable right.
2 4
In Toyomenka-Shoji the court reasoned that since (1) the carrier was "con-
tracting for its own benefit as the 'carrier', 25 and (2) the promised performance
16 Toyomenka, Inc. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 292, 296 (S.D.
Tex. 1972); Mitsui & Co. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 14, 19 (S.D.
Tex. 1972).
17 342 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
18 Id. at 18.
19 Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. S. S. Aurora II, 342 F. Supp. 298-99 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
20 Dorsid Trading Co. v. S. S. Fletero, 342 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
21 Toyomenka, Inc. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 292, 294 (S.D. Tex.
1972); Dorsid Trading Co. v. S. S. Fletero, 342 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
22 342 F. Supp. at 294; 342 F. Supp. at 6.
23 342 F. Supp. at 6.
24 342 F. Supp. at 294; Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. S. S. Aurora II, 342 F. Supp. 298
(S.D. Tex. 1972).
25 342 F. Supp. at 294.
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was to be rendered to the promisee carrier," the stevedore was an incidental
beneficiary. The reasons above do not justify the court's determination that the
stevedore is merely an incidental beneficiary. Later in the opinion the court
assumes arguendo that the stevedore may be a creditor beneficiary and refers to
Simpson's definition of creditor beneficiary which reads in part: "The promisee
[which in this case is the carrier] desires to secure the discharge of his own duty
to the third party, and so to benefit himself."27 The fact that the promisee is
motivated by a desire to indirectly benefit himself by obtaining a benefit for the
third party does not preclude the creditor status but is a prerequisite to that
status. The fact that the promisee-carrier also receives the same type of direct
benefit from the promisor-shipper is not determinative either. The court in
Toyomenka-Shaji has misapplied the Restatement of Contracts principle that
"in all cases in which by the bargained-for promise the promisor understakes a
performance which is to be rendered to the promisee, all third parties are in-
cidental beneficiaries" ' s to the relationship which is established.
The contract at issue does not involve one promise alone but two, one in
which the promisor-shipper bestows the benefit on the carrier, and another in
which the same benefit is bestowed upon the third party stevedore. The court
impliedly assumes that since the same type of benefit is being bestowed on both
the promisee and the third party in the same contract the third party is neces-
sarily an incidental beneficiary. In effect, the court substituted "contract" in
place of "promise" in the Restatement language, and thus it simply misunder-
stood the law. As Judge Bue pointed out in Dorsid: "[I]t is not necessary under
the general rule 'that a contract be exclusively for the benefit of a third person in
order to give him a right of action thereon.' "29 The two reasons offered by the
court in Toyomenka-Shoji do not justify the classification of the stevedore as an
incidental beneficiary.
Although the court in Toyomenka-Shoji did not refer to it, there may be a
third reason to support its determination. Section 133(b) of the Restatement
defines a creditor beneficiary as follows: "A [person is a] creditor beneficiary if
no purpose to make a gift appears ... and the promise will satisfy an actual or
supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary .. ."3 Since in
Toyomenka-Shoji there is no pre-existing duty owed by the carrier to the
stevedore, a strict interpretation of the Restatement would render the stevedore
an incidental beneficiary. This is not to say that such a result is desirable, but
it is consistent with the Restatement position.
The Restatement position itself overlooks certain realities. Apparently the
purpose of the "existing obligation" provision is to assure that the promisor is
motivated by his own economic benefit in securing the promised performance for
the third party. But economic benefit is not only achieved negatively by dis-
charging an existing liability or obligation, but also positively by creating an ad-
26 Id. at 294-95.
27 Id. at 295, quoting Simpson, Contracts § 116 (1965).
28 Id. at 294-95, quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 147 (1932).
29 342 F. Supp. at 9, quoting 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 306 (1938).
30 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932).
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vantage in one's bargaining position. A strict interpretation of the Restatement
ignores this positive economic motive.
The court in Dorsid concluded that the stevedore was a creditor bene-
ficiary, but did not refer to the Restatement's definition and its requisite actual
obligation. Rather, Dorsid concentrates primarily on the intent of the parties to
confer a direct benefit on the stevedore. 1 The court found from the language in
the bill of lading and the fact that the cargo interest requested an extension
initially from the third party stevedore that the stevedore was an intended bene-
ficiary and therefore a creditor beneficiary.
3 2
The analysis in Dorsid in this regard is consistent with the Tentative Draft
of the Second Restatement of Contracts33 which proposes that the intent to
benefit alone is sufficient to sustain an enforceable right in the third party regard-
less of the promisor's motive-donative, negative economic or positive economic.
There is one remaining factual difference between the Dorsid and Shoji
cases which should be considered. That is the fact that in Dorsid the cargo
interest requested the initial extension from both the carrier and stevedore,
whereas in Shoji the extension was requested only of the carrier. As pointed out
above, the request of the stevedore in Dorsid was used by the court as an ad-
ditional indicium of the parties' intent to benefit the third party. The cargo in-
terest manifested by this action his belief in the stevedore's exclusive power to
grant such an extension vis--vis the latter's own interests.3 4 The presence of this
fact in Dorsid certainly assists in showing intent, but the absence of it in Shoji
should not preclude the stevedore in that case from achieving the creditor bene-
ficiary status. In Shoji the language of the bill of lading alone should be sufficient
to sustain the status.
The factual differences between Dorsid and Shoji do not account for the
differing results with regard to the classification of the stevedore as a creditor or
incidental beneficiary. The contrary determinations are most likely the result of
conceptual confusion in Toyomenka-Shoji, although, as has been postulated, it
may be the result of opposing conceptual frameworks as to whether intent alone
is sufficient to create an enforceable third party right.
C. Extent of the Benefit: Variation of the Benefit
At this point it is evident that the stevedore as an intended or creditor bene-
ficiary does have an enforceable right to the one year limitation period but the
essential question remains: Can the promisor-cargo interest and promisee-car-
rier modify that benefit without the agreement of the stevedore? The court in
Shoji-Toyomenka assumes arguendo that the stevedore is a creditor beneficiary
and refers to the Restatement of Contracts, in order to resolve the question. "
According to section 143 of the Restatement, the primary parties to a contract
31 342 F. Supp. at 8; See also 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 304 (1938).
32 342 F. Supp. at 9.
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967).
34 342 F. Supp. at 9.
35 Toyomenka, Inc. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 292, 295 (S.D.
Tex. 1972).
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may vary or modify the established rights of a creditor beneficiary except in
those situations in which the third party has (1) brought suit upon the promise,
or (2) materially changed his position in reliance upon the promise, or (3) the
action of the promisee is a fraud upon the creditors."
The first exception is really a corollary of the second and is clearly not ap-
plicable in this case (i.e., it would be impossible to bring suit on a promise not to
sue beyond a certain time). Clearly, the third exception does not apply to this
case. Therefore, in order to prevent any modification of the limitation period the
stevedore must demonstrate that he has materially changed his position. The
court in rather conclusory language found that the stevedore failed to do this:
"On the facts presented before the court, Texports [the third party stevedore]
has not shown any material change in its position in reliance on the original
contract terms."3 The court does not discuss any of the facts before it, so it
remains to the commentator to conjecture upon what evidence might have been
sufficient to indicate a material change in position.
Presumably, if the stevedore could show that such a provision in a bill of
lading were a standard trade practice or part of the course of dealings between
himself and the carrier, then entering into the oral contract with the carrier for
the discharge of the goods would be a material change in position in reliance on
the promise. If the stevedore could demonstrate that there was a price discount
or additional services provided for those carriers who had provided the stevedore
with such a benefit, this too would be indicative of a material change in position.
However, it is more likely that there is no neat, easily demonstrable one-to-one
relationship between benefits and reliances in the complexity of commercial deal-
ings.
But, even if there were no material reliance on the part of the stevedore
upon entering the contract or during his performance there could be a material
reliance after the limitation period had passed. One year after delivery or after
any extensions granted by the stevedore, the shipper's promise vis-a-vis the
stevedore is transformed into one of forebearance. In effect, the shipper has
said, "I will not bring an action against you now." Forebearance promises create
even more difficult problems in the ability of a third party to demonstrate any
material reliance. A promise not to do something elicits a negative reliance; the
relying party does not do those things which he would have done but for the
forebearance promise. So too, the stevedore might have taken some affirmative
action which he might not otherwise have taken had he considered himself sus-
ceptible to suit. But there is no reason to expect that the stevedore could point
to any one decision which he made in reliance on his supposed immunity.
Rather, it is reasonable to presume that the immunity from suit became one of the
given factors among many in the corporate decision-making process. The "ma-
terial change in position" test, which appears extremely inclusive and conceptu-
ally satisfying, offers prohibitive difficulties in proof especially when the promise
is one to forebear.
In Dorsid the court does not mention the "material change in position" test
36 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 143 (1932).
37 342 F. Supp. at 295.
[ApriI, 1973]
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but after concluding that the stevedore is an intended creditor beneficiary,
states:
The fact that the carrier . . . , has chosen to waive one of its benefits ac-
cruing under the bill of lading .. .should not mean that Strachan [the
stevedore] is concurrently stripped of that same benefit without any voice
in the matter. Although the extension of the "exemptions and immunities
from and limitations of liability" to the stevedore is dependent upon the
carrier's right to such benefits, the decision whether to exercise or to waive
any specific benefit is not so dependent.3 8
There are at least two possible explanations for this decision by the court. First,
once having created the right in the third party stevedore the parties could not
vary or modify that right without his permission. This would be an absolutist
position which regards enforceable rights of third parties as immutable. This
view is at conceptual odds with the Restatement. Second, the court could simply
have presumed that the stevedore would materially change its position upon such
a promise, that it did so, and that therefore its rights could not be modified.
Besides the failure of the stevedore to demonstrate a "material change of
position" the court in Toyomenka-Shoji presented another rationale supporting
its finding that the carrier was entitled to unilaterally modify the benefit ac-
cruing to the stevedore. The court placed heavy emphasis on the language in the
bill of lading: "[T]he carrier shall be deemed to contract for the benefit of all
such parties [stevedores] in this regard.""9 The court concludes that these lines
created an agency relationship between the stevedore and carrier so that in order
to exercise rights under the bill of lading the stevedore implicitly recognized
the carrier as his agent and thereby was bound by whatever modifications the
carrier had made.4 Given this interpretation, the question as to whether or
not the stevedore had materially changed its position is insignificant; even if it
had, this agency relationship would presumably overcome the reliance. Further-
more, how could anyone reasonably rely on a promise which the court interprets
as totally open-ended?
The court's interpretation of the "contract for the benefit" clause is ques-
tionable. Given the context in which the words appear41 they could have been
interpreted as simply emphasizing the fact that when the carrier contracted
with the third parties they would receive the benefits. This is probably the inter-
pretation which the stevedore gave the language. The court in Toyomenka-
Shoji offers no case law to support the establishment of an agency relationship
on such ambiguous language.
Although the Dorsid bill of lading does not employ the "contract for the
benefit" language, its rationale was incorporated by Judge Bue in Mitsui & Co.
v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha42 which, as was pointed out earlier, has the
same bill of lading as that in Toyomenka - Shoji. Therefore, even if Dorsid had
38 342 F. Supp. at 9.
39 342 F. Supp. at 296.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 294 n.2.
42 342 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
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contained the "contract for the benefit" language, Judge Bue's decision in that
case would not have been altered.
D. Summary
Judge Singleton in Toyomenka-Shoji found that the stevedore could not
bar a direct action because: (1) the stevedore was an incidental beneficiary and
therefore had no enforceable right to the one year period;43 (2) even if the
stevedore was a creditor beneficiary, his right could and was modified by the
parties since he did not show a material change in position;" and (3) even if
the stevedore was a creditor beneficiary, and presumably, even had he materially
changed his position, the carrier was his agent and the stevedore was bound by
his extension. 5 In Dorsid, on the other hand, Judge Bue held that the direct
action by the cargo interest was barred since (1) the stevedore was a creditor
beneficiary,' and (2) the parties could not waive the stevedore's rights without
his permission."
III. Third Party Action for Indemnity
As was previously noted, in Shoji, not only did the cargo interest bring a
direct action against the stevedore, but the carrier, having been sued by the
cargo interest, brought a third party action for indemnity against the stevedore
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(c). The stevedore, of course, contended that this
action was barred by reason of the one-year statute of limitations contained in
the bill of lading to which he was a third-party beneficiary.
Toyomenka, the companion case to Shaji, deals with the same factual situa-
tion and issue. In fact, there are two other cases with similiar facts and issues,
Marubeni-Iida, Inc. v. Toka Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha" decided by Judge Single-
ton, and Mitsui & Co. v. Tako Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha,"' decided by Judge
Bue. Since all four cases involve the same defendant-carrier, the pertinent
clauses in the bills of lading are identical.5" Furthermore, the only factual dif-
ferences in the four cases are: (1) the particular identity of the plaintiff-cargo
interest (i.e., whether shipper, shipper's insurer or cargo owner) which is not
material, since each cargo interest is similarly bound by the provisions of the bill
of lading; (2) the timing of the indemnity suit (i.e, whether the action was
brought beyond the extended period or, where no extension was involved, beyond
the one year period) which is not determinative either, since in each case the
action was brought after the limitation period to which the stevedore contended
43 342 F. Supp. at 294.
44 Id. at 295.
45 Id. at 296.
46 342 F. Supp. at 6.
47 Id. at 9.
48 327 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
49 342 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
50 Toyomenka, Inc. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 292, 293-94 n.1 & 2
(S.D. Tex. 1972); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. S. S. Aurora II, 342 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.
Tex. 1972); Mitsui & Co. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 14, 17 (S.D.




he was entitled. The crucial factors are that the plaintiff is bound by the bill
of lading and that the indemnity action was brought after the period to which
the stevedore thought he was entitled, which are common to each case.
The central issue in each case was whether or not the one year limitation
period could be "transposed and utilized as a defense to the indemnity action
which is a separate lawsuit."'" The stevedores, of course, maintained that it
could be. Their rationale was that clause 24 of the bill of lading extended to
them "all exemptions, immunities from and limitations of liability granted to,
the carrier, ... including, but not limited to, those limitations set forth in clauses
17 and 19!"52 Clause 19 states that: "[I]n any event the carrier... shall be dis-
charged from all liability . . . including, . . . any claims by . . . connecting
carriers for... indemnification... !,' The stevedores contend they are entitled
to the same benefit, 4 and this argument certainly is a reasonable interpretation
of the language of clause 19. However, the court in Toyomenka, Shoji and
Marubeni never would have had to consider the nature of the stevedore's rights,
since the court felt that if a direct action were not barred, it followed that the
third party action also should be upheld.
The court in Marubeni does discuss another reason to support its decision
that the stevedore is not entitled to prevent an indemnity action. Judge Single-
ton contended that to allow the stevedore to bar the carrier's action for indem-
nity could potentially work a great hardship on the carrier. The court conjec-
tures that the cargo interests could delay filing suit until the final day of the one
year period and thereby preclude the carrier from his indemnity suit.-5 The
likelihood of this occurrence is questionable at best and certainly does not over-
come the actual hardship which the stevedores are undergoing in these four
cases by having, as they contend, their liability extended indefinitely.' It is
not a balancing of hardships or equities which provides the soundest support
for these decisions, but a return to the fundamental conceptual framework of
third party beneficiary law, that is, the promisee obtaining a promise from the
promisor, the performance of which will be rendered to the third party.
One might expect that Judge Bue, having determined in Dorsid that the
stevedore could effectively bar a direct action by cargo interests, would have
determined in Mitsui that the stevedore could similarly bar a third party action
by the carrier for indemnity against the stevedore. However, the court in Mitsui
is in accord with Judge Singleton's decisions in Toyomenka, Shoji and Maru-
beni that the rights obtained by a stevedore through the bill of lading do not
empower him to bar a third party indemnity suit by the carrier."
51 Mitsui & Co. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 14, 18 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
52 Id. at 17.
53 Id. at 17.
54 Toyomenka, Inc. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 292, 293 (S.D. Tex.
1972); Mitsui & Co. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 14, 17 (S.D. TexM
1972).
55 Marubeni-Iida, Inc. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 327 F. Supp. 519, 523 (S.D.
Tex. 1971).
56 Toyomenka, Inc. v. Toko Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 292, 297 (S.D. Tex.
1972); Mitsui & Co. v. Toko Kalun Kabushiki Kaisha, 342 F. Supp. 14, 17 (S.D. Tex. 1972).




Part of the difficulty with interpreting the bill of lading is that in clause 24
the bill of lading includes stevedore and other third parties within the term
"carrier." The court in Mitsui concluded that the language of the bill of lading
did not make the stevedore a "carrier" for the purpose of COGSA, thereby
qualifying the stevedore for the one year limitation vis-a-vis indemnity suit."'
The court also pointed out that the better interpretation of the bill of lading
was not achieved by simply substituting the word "stevedore" wherever the
word "carrier" appeared. 9 Even assuming the court's interpretation is a correct
one, it still does not answer why the contract includes stevedores within the
term "carrier." More importantly, how would a third party reasonably inter-
pret this language? Defining the stevedore as a "carrier" need not be considered
an attempt to extend the coverage of the statute beyond its scope, but may be
an indication that the parties intended to extend the benefits of that statute to
the third party. The court in effect attributes no significance at all to the lan-
guage in the first half of clause 24.
Succinctly stated, the court's reasoning in Mitsui is this: (1) the bill of
lading was intended to determine the "relations between the shipper, consignee
and the carrier," not between the carrier and the stevedore; 60 (2) however, the
carrier did obtain certain benefits for the stevedore from the shipper, so that
the bill of lading also determines certain relations between the shipper and the
stevedore;61 (3) the stevedore was entitled to those benefits which could be said
to have been granted to him by the shipper, namely, the one year statute of
limitations on actions brought by the shipper against the stevedore; = (4) the
stevedore was not entitled to those benefits which could only be conferred by the
carrier, namely, the one year limitation period on actions for contribution and
indemnity brought by the carrier against the stevedore."
Underlying this analysis is the fundamental promisor-promisee-beneficiary
structure of third party beneficiary law. What the court is saying is that the
language in the bill of lading did not transform the carrier into a promisor,
vis-k-vis the third party stevedore. More specifically, the promisor-shipper
promises the promisee-carrier, by including the provisions of COGSA, not to sue
the carrier within one year. The immunity of the carrier from contribution and
indemnity are not granted to it by the shipper but are conferred upon it by the
operation of the statute. The court interprets the language of clause 24 as
extending to the third party stevedore only those benefits "granted to" the
carrier by the promisor-shipper, namely the immunity from direct suit by it,
the shipper. The only way that the stevedore might obtain immunity from the
carrier would be if the carrier were not only the promisee obtaining the benefit
for the third party, but also a promisor, promising the shipper-promisee not to
bring an action for indemnity against the third party stevedore except within
one year. The issue is not whether the right of the stevedore can be transposed
58 Id. at 19.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 18.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 19.
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but whether or not the language of the bill of lading transposed the carrier
into a promisor and thereby extended the right to the stevedore. Both Judge
Bue and Judge Singleton did not feel that the language in the bill indicated an
intent on the part of the contracting parties to extend such a benefit.
As has been indicated, the motivation for the.inclusion of the stevedore as a
"carrier" was left unanswered. Similarly, a question remains as to why clause
24 states that all the benefits granted to the carrier are also granted to the third
parties, if the benefits regarding the immunity from indemnification and contri-
bution are not extended. The court seems to say that the parties did not mean
to define the stevedore as a carrier, and they did not mean to say that all the
benefits were extended. But the fact remains that the parties did just those
things.
Although the court's analysis in Mitsui may be conceptually satisfying, the
deeper question is whether or not that conceptual analysis is consistent with
the expectations of the parties and the reasonable manifestation of intent con-
veyed by the language in the bill of lading. Judge Singleton notes apologetically
in Toyomenka that "the commercial necessity of bills of lading between carriers
and cargo ... may sometimes be harsh on the less acumen third party steve-
dore."64 Apparently an extremely high level of acumen is demanded of the
average stevedore.
IV. Conclusion
The effect of the Toyomenkc, Shaji, Marubeni and Mitsui decisions holding
that the action for indemnity against a stevedore is not barred by the one-year
limitations period for all practical purposes undermines the significance of the
Dorsid decision barring direct actions. A carrier may now unilaterally extend
the period in which suit may be brought by the cargo interest against the steve-
dore and although the shipper will most likely not be able to sue the stevedore,
the carrier may still maintain his action for indemnity."5 The stevedore's liability
for damage to the goods has effectively been extended beyond one year, albeit
indirectly. The stevedore's right.to a one year statute of limitations is a hollow
one if the Marubeni, Mitsui, and Toyomenka-Shoji rationales are followed.
In order for the stevedore to assure that his right to a one-year statute of
limitations is a meaningful one he should take steps along the following lines.
First, the stevedore should make certain that there is no language that could be
interpreted as creating an agency relationship between himself and the carrier.
This suggestion does not imply that the court in Toyomenka-Shoji was correct
in its interpretation of the "contract for the benefit" language, but it is better
to avoid any potential controversy. Second, the stevedore should persuade the
parties to the bill of lading to include language therein which would make it
clear that the benefits extended may be modified or waived only by the steve-
dore. This would avoid any after-the-fact determinations as to whether or not
the stevedore had "materially changed his position" which, as has been indi-
64 342 F. Supp. at 297 (emphasis added).
65 342 F. Supp. at 297.
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cated, may be difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate. Third, as Toyomenka
suggests, the stevedore should contract directly with the carrier for a one year
statute of limitations on all actions between them including indemnification. 6
This is not to say that the stevedore could not (or, in the cases we have consid-
ered, did not) receive such a benefit as a third party beneficiary. The point here
is that if one can avoid the conceptual complexity and "intricate maze of legal
verbosity"6 it would be best to do so.
This analysis has illustrated several of the conceptual frameworks with
which courts approach third party beneficiary problems, and inferentially rec-
ommended the preferable positions. Namely, in the determination of whether
or not a third party has an enforceable right, the focus should be exclusively
on intent and not positive or negative economic motive. The "material change
in position" test should be replaced with a presumption that the party would
rely on the promise and that the promise is not variable. Taking the reform one
step further, the rule should be that the right is not variable unless so stated by
the parties or conversely that the rights of the third party are variable unless stated
to the contrary. 8 In either case, this area of the law would be given the definite-
ness it needs, and the rights of the third party would become more certain.
James E. Dahl
66 Id. at 295.
67 RESTATEMENT '(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 142 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967).
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